There are other tables listed. These are generally for more experi¬enced investors and those interested in taking higher risks. For example, there are tables showing the trading on several different exchanges in listed options—primarily options to buy or sell common stocks (call options and put options). There are futures prices— commodity futures and also interest rate futures, foreign currency futures, and stock index futures. There are also options relating to interest rates and options relating to the stock index futures.
6. EUROPEAN STOCKMARKETS–GENERAL TREND
Competition among Europe's securities exchanges is fierce. Yet most investors and companies would prefer fewer, bigger markets. If the exchanges do not get together to provide them, electronic usurpers will.
How many stock exchanges does a Europe with a single capital market need? Nobody knows. But a part-answer is clear: fewer than it has today. America has eight stock exchanges, and seven futures and options exchanges. Of these only the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, NASDAQ (the over-the-counter market), and the two Chicago futures exchanges have substantial turnover and nationwide preten-sions.
The 12 member countries of the European Community (EC), in contrast, boast 32 stock exchanges and 23 futures and options exchanges. Of these, the market in London, Frankfurt, Paris, Amsterdam, Milan and Madrid–at least–aspire to significant roles on the European and world stages. And the number of exchanges is growing. Recent arrivals include exchanges in Italy and Spain. In eastern Germany, Leipzig wants to reopen the stock exchange that was closed in 1945.
Admittedly, the EC is not as integrated as the United States. Most intermediaries, investors and compa-nies are still national rather than pan-European in character. So is the job of regulating securities markets; there is no European equivalent of America's Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Taxes, company law and accounting practices vary widely. Several regulatory barriers to cross-border investment, for instance by pension funds, remain in place. Recent turmoil in Europe's exchange rate mechanics has reminded cross0border investors about currency risk. Despite the Maastricht treaty, talk of a common currency is little more than that
Yet the local loyalties that sustain so many European exchanges look increasingly out-of-date. Coun-tries that once had regional stock exchanges have seen them merged into one. A single European market for financial services is on its way. The EC's investment services directive, which should come into force in 1996, will permit cross-border stockbroking without the need to set up local subsidiaries. Jean-Francois Theodore, chairman of the Paris Bourse, says this will lead to another European Big Bang. And finance is the multina-tional business par excellence: electronics and the end of most capital controls mean that securities traders roam not just Europe but the globe in search of the best returns.
This affects more than just stock exchanges. Investors want financial market that are cheap, accessible and of high liquidity (the ability to buy or sell shares without moving the price). Businesses, large and small, need a capital market in which they can raise finance at the lowest possible cost If European exchanges do not meet these requirements, Europe's economy suffers.
In the past few years the favoured way of shaking up bourses has been competition. The event that trig-gered this was London's Big Bang in October 1986, which opened its stock exchange to banks and foreigners, and introduced a screen-plus-telephone system of securities trading known as SEAQ. Within weeks the trading floor had been abandoned. At the time, other European bourses saw Big Bang as a British eccentricity. Their markets matched buy and sell orders (order-driven trading), whereas London is a market in which dealers quote firm prices for trades (quote-driven trading). Yet many continental markets soon found themselves forced to copy London's example.
That was because Big Bang had strengthened London's grip on international equity-trading. SEAQ's in-ternational arm quickly grab¬bed chunks of European business. Today the London exchange reckons to handle around 95% of all European cross-border share-trading It claims to handle three-quarters of the trading in blue-chip shares based in Holland, half of those in France and Italy and a quarter of those in Germany—though, as will become clear, there is some dispute about these figures.
London's market-making tradition and the presence of many international fund managers helped it to win this business. So did three other factors. One was stamp duties on share deals done in their home coun-tries, which SEAQ usually avoided. Another was the shortness of trading hours on continental bourses. The third was the ability of SEAQ, with market-makers quoting two-way prices for business in large amounts, to handle trades in big blocks of stock that can be fed through order-driven markets only when they find counter-parts.
A similar tussle for business has been seen among the ex¬changes that trade futures and options. Here, the market which first trades a given product tends to corner the business in it. The European Options Ex-change (EOE) in Amsterdam was the first derivatives exchange in Europe; today it is the only one to trade a European equity-index option. London's LIFFE, which opened in 1982 and is now Europe's biggest deriva-tives exchange, has kept a two-to-one lead in German government-bond futures (its most active contract) over Frankfurt's DTB, which opened only in 1990. LIFFE competes with several other European exchanges, not always successfully: it lost the market in ecu-bond futures to Paris's MATIF.
European exchanges armoured themselves for this battle in three ways. The first was to fend off foreign competition with rules. In three years of wrangling over the EC's investment-services directive, several member-countries pushed for rules that would require securities to be traded only on a recognized exchange. They also demanded rules for the disclosure of trades and prices that would have hamstrung SEAQ's quote-driven trading system. They were beaten off in the eventual compromise, partly because governments realized they risked driving business outside the EC. But residual attempts to stifle competition remain. Italy passed a law in 1991 requiring trades in Italian shares to be conducted through a firm based in Italy. Under pressure from the European Commission, it may have to repeal it.
6.1 New Ways for Old
The second response to competition has been frantic efforts by bourses to modernize systems, improve services and cut costs. This has meant investing in new trading systems, improving the way deals are settled, and pressing governments to scrap stamp duties. It has also increasingly meant trying to beat London at its own game, for instance by searching for ways of matching London's prowess in block trading.
Paris, which galvanized itself in 1988, is a good example. Its bourse is now open to outsiders. It has a computerized trading system based on continuous auctions, and
6. EUROPEAN STOCKMARKETS–GENERAL TREND
Competition among Europe's securities exchanges is fierce. Yet most investors and companies would prefer fewer, bigger markets. If the exchanges do not get together to provide them, electronic usurpers will.
How many stock exchanges does a Europe with a single capital market need? Nobody knows. But a part-answer is clear: fewer than it has today. America has eight stock exchanges, and seven futures and options exchanges. Of these only the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, NASDAQ (the over-the-counter market), and the two Chicago futures exchanges have substantial turnover and nationwide preten-sions.
The 12 member countries of the European Community (EC), in contrast, boast 32 stock exchanges and 23 futures and options exchanges. Of these, the market in London, Frankfurt, Paris, Amsterdam, Milan and Madrid–at least–aspire to significant roles on the European and world stages. And the number of exchanges is growing. Recent arrivals include exchanges in Italy and Spain. In eastern Germany, Leipzig wants to reopen the stock exchange that was closed in 1945.
Admittedly, the EC is not as integrated as the United States. Most intermediaries, investors and compa-nies are still national rather than pan-European in character. So is the job of regulating securities markets; there is no European equivalent of America's Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Taxes, company law and accounting practices vary widely. Several regulatory barriers to cross-border investment, for instance by pension funds, remain in place. Recent turmoil in Europe's exchange rate mechanics has reminded cross0border investors about currency risk. Despite the Maastricht treaty, talk of a common currency is little more than that
Yet the local loyalties that sustain so many European exchanges look increasingly out-of-date. Coun-tries that once had regional stock exchanges have seen them merged into one. A single European market for financial services is on its way. The EC's investment services directive, which should come into force in 1996, will permit cross-border stockbroking without the need to set up local subsidiaries. Jean-Francois Theodore, chairman of the Paris Bourse, says this will lead to another European Big Bang. And finance is the multina-tional business par excellence: electronics and the end of most capital controls mean that securities traders roam not just Europe but the globe in search of the best returns.
This affects more than just stock exchanges. Investors want financial market that are cheap, accessible and of high liquidity (the ability to buy or sell shares without moving the price). Businesses, large and small, need a capital market in which they can raise finance at the lowest possible cost If European exchanges do not meet these requirements, Europe's economy suffers.
In the past few years the favoured way of shaking up bourses has been competition. The event that trig-gered this was London's Big Bang in October 1986, which opened its stock exchange to banks and foreigners, and introduced a screen-plus-telephone system of securities trading known as SEAQ. Within weeks the trading floor had been abandoned. At the time, other European bourses saw Big Bang as a British eccentricity. Their markets matched buy and sell orders (order-driven trading), whereas London is a market in which dealers quote firm prices for trades (quote-driven trading). Yet many continental markets soon found themselves forced to copy London's example.
That was because Big Bang had strengthened London's grip on international equity-trading. SEAQ's in-ternational arm quickly grab¬bed chunks of European business. Today the London exchange reckons to handle around 95% of all European cross-border share-trading It claims to handle three-quarters of the trading in blue-chip shares based in Holland, half of those in France and Italy and a quarter of those in Germany—though, as will become clear, there is some dispute about these figures.
London's market-making tradition and the presence of many international fund managers helped it to win this business. So did three other factors. One was stamp duties on share deals done in their home coun-tries, which SEAQ usually avoided. Another was the shortness of trading hours on continental bourses. The third was the ability of SEAQ, with market-makers quoting two-way prices for business in large amounts, to handle trades in big blocks of stock that can be fed through order-driven markets only when they find counter-parts.
A similar tussle for business has been seen among the ex¬changes that trade futures and options. Here, the market which first trades a given product tends to corner the business in it. The European Options Ex-change (EOE) in Amsterdam was the first derivatives exchange in Europe; today it is the only one to trade a European equity-index option. London's LIFFE, which opened in 1982 and is now Europe's biggest deriva-tives exchange, has kept a two-to-one lead in German government-bond futures (its most active contract) over Frankfurt's DTB, which opened only in 1990. LIFFE competes with several other European exchanges, not always successfully: it lost the market in ecu-bond futures to Paris's MATIF.
European exchanges armoured themselves for this battle in three ways. The first was to fend off foreign competition with rules. In three years of wrangling over the EC's investment-services directive, several member-countries pushed for rules that would require securities to be traded only on a recognized exchange. They also demanded rules for the disclosure of trades and prices that would have hamstrung SEAQ's quote-driven trading system. They were beaten off in the eventual compromise, partly because governments realized they risked driving business outside the EC. But residual attempts to stifle competition remain. Italy passed a law in 1991 requiring trades in Italian shares to be conducted through a firm based in Italy. Under pressure from the European Commission, it may have to repeal it.
6.1 New Ways for Old
The second response to competition has been frantic efforts by bourses to modernize systems, improve services and cut costs. This has meant investing in new trading systems, improving the way deals are settled, and pressing governments to scrap stamp duties. It has also increasingly meant trying to beat London at its own game, for instance by searching for ways of matching London's prowess in block trading.
Paris, which galvanized itself in 1988, is a good example. Its bourse is now open to outsiders. It has a computerized trading system based on continuous auctions, and
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